Financing Entrepreneurs Better Canadian Policy for Venture Capital by Douglas Cumming
Commentary
C.D.Howe Institute
www.cdhowe.org ISSN 0824-8001 No. 247 April 2007
Douglas Cumming
In this issue...
Canadian policymakers should pursue new options for facilitating
investment in innovation and entrepreneurship. Better venture capital
policy is the place to start, because existing tools for delivering financial




Policy for Venture CapitalThe Study in Brief
Innovation and growth depend in large part on entrepreneurship, which in turn may require financing in
the form of venture capital investment.
In Canada, Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) have become the dominant
source of venture capital. There is reason for concern over this development, because evidence suggests
LSVCCs are inefficient investment vehicles, charging high fees and yielding disappointing results: very
few funds generate positive returns. Moreover, government tax subsidies to LSVCCs may crowd out
private venture investment.
Accordingly, Canadian policymakers should investigate other ways to facilitate entrepreneurial
investment. Potential changes to the legal environment begin with capital gains taxation: evidence shows
that a reduction in the capital gains tax rate stimulates venture capital funding. More generous treatment
for employee stock options is also an option for Canada.
Also on the legislative front, improving the entrepreneur-friendliness of bankruptcy laws to
encourage startups, and less-onerous securities regulation are liberalizing approaches that may offer
important benefits, although with potential costs if, for example, relaxed prospectus requirements
increased the incidence of fraud. 
Among the suite of broader policy choices: direct government investment programs, such as the
United States’ Small Business Innovation Research Program and Australia’s Innovation Investment Funds.
While these programs involve public subsidization of venture capital, the US and Australian examples
have generated records indicating effectiveness in fostering innovation and economic development.
In short, Canada’s key venture capital initiative, the LSVCC, has run its course and should not be
retained. Numerous options exist, and Canadian policymakers can learn from successes and failures
abroad and at home.
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he Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD
1996) argues that the financing of entrepreneurship and innovative ideas
will facilitate economic growth and the competitive advantage of nations
in the 21st century. Much evidence, albeit not all, indicates that small,
growth-oriented, high-technology start-up companies contribute
disproportionately to innovation and economic growth.
1 The primary source of
capital for these companies is venture capital, and venture capital facilitates the
success of firms that eventually list on stock exchanges. For example, during the
1983–92 period, while venture firms averaged less than 3 percent of corporate
research and development, they were nevertheless responsible for more than 8
percent of industrial innovation in the United States (Kortum and Lerner 2000). 
A widely held perception is that entrepreneurial companies are not able to
raise all the capital they need and that good companies are not getting funded.
2 In
theory, one might expect such a “capital gap” because investment in
entrepreneurial companies not listed on stock exchanges is typically highly illiquid
and riskier than most other investments due to information asymmetries and the
nascent technologies such firms are developing. As well, there is a perception that
innovating entrepreneurs and their investors do not fully capture returns to
innovation because there are broader returns to the development of an innovative
society — in other words,  that the social rate of return to financing
entrepreneurial high-tech start-up companies is greater than the private rate of
return. As an empirical matter, however, capital gaps are difficult to measure, and
there is little consensus as to the extent of the capital gap for entrepreneurial firms
(Canada 2002). Regardless, given the perception of such a gap, a major strategic
focus of policymakers around the world has been the high-tech sectors and the
stimulation of venture capital markets through direct government investment
programs and laws that are appropriately designed to facilitate entrepreneurship
and entrepreneurial finance. For example, the World Bank spent more than US$10
billion in the 2001–05 period to promote small enterprises (Beck et al. 2005). 
In most Canadian jurisdictions, the primary government support mechanism
for venture capital since the 1980s has been the Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital
Corporation (LSVCC) program. One estimate places the cost of the LSVCC
program between 1992 and 2002 at $3 billion at least (Cumming and MacIntosh
2004). Yet the data reported in recent studies of the LSVCC program point to a lack
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I have benefited from helpful comments from Finn Poschmann, Barry Norris, Bill Robson, Ben
Tomlin, Yvan Guillemette, the Business Development Bank of Canada, and an anonymous
referee. Data and assistance with creating Figure 4 were provided by www.Morningstar.ca. I have
also benefited from working with Jeff MacIntosh on related prior papers.
1 See World Bank (1994, 2002, 2004); see also Canada (2002, 2006) for Canadian-specific analyses
and policy discussions that are closely related to the discussion herein.
2 On this apparent capital gap, see, for example, http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/insbrp-
rppe.nsf/en/rd01918e.html. Some commentators on an earlier draft of this paper suggested that
capital gaps exist in Canada for late-stage venture capital, so that Canadian firms must seek
capital from US investors to get suitable financing. Data in one recent empirical study (Cosh,
Cumming, and Hughes 2006) show, however, that entrepreneurs typically are able to raise the
capital they want, although not always in the form they would like. More data collection and
further empirical analyses are warranted.of success.
3 Accordingly, in the first part of this Commentary, I review the reasons
the LSVCC program has not been successful. LSVCCs differ in quality, and not all
labour-sponsored funds have been failures; nevertheless, reasons exist for
questioning the benefits of government expenditures on LSVCCs.
In the second part of the Commentary, I review evidence from other countries
on a range of alternative mechanisms that could replace the LSVCC program.
4
These mechanisms, which focus on strategies other than intervention programs in
the form of the LSVCC, include capital gains taxation, taxation of stock options,
securities laws, bankruptcy laws, patent policy, labour laws, accounting rules, and
regulation of venture capital funds. I also discuss programs in other countries
(such as the United States and Australia) that match government money with
private contributions to venture capital funds.
An Overview of LSVCCs
LSVCCs are tax-subsidized investment funds designed like mutual funds. Unlike
mutual funds that invest in companies listed on stock exchanges, however,
LSVCCs invest in privately held companies that are not listed — typically, high-
growth companies in the technology sectors. In exchange for tax subsidies,
LSVCCs face statutory covenants that restrict their investment activity. LSVCCs
have a three-pronged mandate to maximize employment, shareholder value, and
economic development in the jurisdiction in which they are based. Most LSVCCs,
however, state publicly that their only interest is in maximizing shareholder value
(see MacIntosh 1994, 1997; Halpern 1997; Cumming and MacIntosh, forthcoming).
LSVCCs must be sponsored by a labour union, but critics charge that labour
unions merely rent their name to LSVCCs without providing any additional
governance over the funds’ operations.
5
LSVCCs were first introduced in Quebec in 1983. Thereafter, the federal
government adopted LSVCC legislation in 1987, British Columbia in 1989,
Manitoba in 1991, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island in 1992, New
Brunswick in 1993, and Nova Scotia in 1994. Only Alberta and Newfoundland and
Labrador have not yet adopted such legislation. In 2005, there were 125 Labour-
Sponsored Venture Capital Funds (LSVCFs) in Canada,
6 including 16 federal
2 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
3 This part of the Commentary draws on a number of recent studies of Canada’s venture capital
market, including work the author has prepared with Professor Jeffrey MacIntosh of the
University of Toronto; see Cumming and MacIntosh (2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2006, 2007). For related
studies, see also MacIntosh (1994, 1997); Halpern (1997); Amit, Brander, and Zott (1998); Osborne
and Sandler (1998); Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002); Anderson and Tian (2003); and
Cumming (2005a, 2005b, 2006a). 
4 This discussion is based on a survey of a number of recent academic studies of venture capital
markets in other countries, including, but not limited to, Lerner (2002); Armour and Cumming
(2006); Cumming and Johan (2006b, 2006d); and Cumming (2007).
5 For example, testimony before the Manitoba legislature in 1997, six years after Manitoba’s
LSVCC legislation was introduced, is consistent with this view; see
http://www.gov.mb.ca/legislature/hansard/3rd-36th/vol_061a/h061a_4.html.
6 Some LSVCCs manage more than one LSVCF, such as GrowthWorks and the Canadian Medical
Discoveries Fund.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 3
Table 1: Tax Savings from an Individual Investment of
$5,000 in a Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Fund, by Taxable Income Bracket

















(dollars unless otherwise specified)
Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) Investment 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000
Federal tax credit 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
Provincial tax credit
a 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
Combined federal and provincial tax credit 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
RRSP tax savings 1,110 1,410 1,560 1,655 1,855 1,970 2,170 2,320
Combined federal and provincial income tax rates Up to 22.2% 28.2% 31.2% 33.1% 37.1% 39.4% 43.4% 46.4%
Total tax credits and tax savings Up to 2,610 2,910 3,060 3,155 3,355 3,470 3,670 3,820
Net out-of-pocket cost At least 2,390 2,090 1,940 1,845 1,645 1,530 1,330 $1,180
Initial return
b = ($5,000 - out-of-pocket cost) /
out-of-pocket cost
109% 139% 158% 171% 204% 227% 276% 324%
a This table uses Ontario provincial rates as of August 2005; for other provincial rates, see http://www.bestcapital.ca/why_invest.htm.
b Calculation does not include any returns (losses) that may be generated by a LSVCF’s investment activities.
Sources: http://www.bestcapital.ca/why_invest.htm; Canada, Department of Finance; and Cumming and MacIntosh, forthcoming.
funds, 67 in Ontario, 7 in British Columbia, 2 in each of Saskatchewan and
Manitoba, 3 in Quebec, and 28 in the Atlantic provinces.
Only individuals (retail investors) may invest in a LSVCC; while tax credits are
capped, there are no restrictions on the size of their investment. Investors receive
tax subsidies so long as the LSVCC follows the statutory covenants that govern
the fund. Investors are, however, subject to an eight-year lock-in period, which
restricts their ability to vote with their feet by moving their capital out of poorly
performing funds, thereby limiting competition among LSVCCs (see Cumming
and MacIntosh (2006, forthcoming). That only individuals may invest in LSVCCs
clearly means that no one has the ability or incentive to control managers; by
contrast, pension funds with large holdings in a firm have incentives to have a
“chat” with managers.
Most individuals invest in LSVCCs to take advantage of the tax savings that
are provided through individual registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs) —
indeed, LSVCCs typically advertise such savings as the most advantageous reason
for investing in them (Cumming and MacIntosh, forthcoming). Tax benefits vary
depending on the individual investor’s tax bracket, as Table 1 shows, and are
more favourable for those in higher tax brackets. In the Ontario example shown in
the table, for an investor in the highest tax bracket, the initial tax-generated return
on a $5,000 investment was more than 323 percent.
LSVCCs are bound by a number of statutory constraints, which are similar in
each province (for details, see Cumming and MacIntosh 2004). These include4 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
limits on the geographical range of investment opportunities to within the
sponsoring jurisdiction, constraints on the size and nature of investment in any
given entrepreneurial company, and requirements to reinvest fixed percentages of
contributed capital in private entrepreneurial companies within a stated period of
time (typically one to three years, depending on the jurisdiction). These constraints
are extremely inefficient, however, because they limit investment opportunities
and, at times, force LSVCCs to make investments in inferior companies without
adequate due diligence (Cumming and MacIntosh, forthcoming). Private
independent limited partnership venture capital funds also have constraints or
restrictive covenants, imposed by their institutional investors, but they differ
significantly from those placed on LSVCCs. For instance, covenants on the former
include restrictions on the use of debt (to prevent fund managers from leveraging
the fund and increasing the risk to institutional investors), and time restrictions on
fundraising by fund managers for their subsequent funds (to force fund managers
to spend their time pursuing and nurturing investments that further the interests
of the current fund beneficiaries).
7 These covenants also vary depending on the
agreed-on needs of the fund investors and fund manager, which enables the
limited partners and the general partner to design covenants that are best suited to
the fund’s particular objectives. LSVCC constraints, in contrast, are invariant
across funds and change over time only with statutory changes.
To provide some sense of the relative importance of LSVCC venture capital in
Canada, Figures 1 through 4 present relevant data on such funds. For example, by
2005, LSVCCs accounted for roughly half of all venture capital under
management, with more than $10 billion (in 2004 dollars) under management (see
Figure 1), while much of the capital allocated by institutional investors but not yet
invested over the 1988–2004 period has accumulated in LSVCCs (see Figure 2).
8 At
the same time, however, LSVCCs do not even outperform risk-free, 30-day
treasury bills (see Figure 3), and only three LSVCCs have earned a positive rate of
return over the past five years (see Figure 4); indeed, even the best LSVCCs do not
earn rates of return that are comparable to the worst performers among small-cap
funds.
9
7 For US evidence, see Gompers and Lerner (1999); for international evidence, see Cumming and
Johan (2006b).
8 Some LSVCCs (such as Working Ventures in 1997 and Fonds de Solidarité in 2002/03) had an
excess of capital available for investment and thereby had to limit their capital contributions from
individual investors, since they could not reinvest the money on time; that is, they did not want
to face the statutory penalties for not reinvesting the contributed money within the time
constraint.
9 One common explanation of the poor performance of LSVCCs is that they are not pure profit
maximizers. Some commentators state there is anecdotal evidence that certain funds are doing a
good job when viewed in conjunction with their multifaceted statutory objectives (profit
maximization, labour growth, regional development, and so on). A commentator on an earlier
draft of this paper pointed out that LSVCCs in Quebec differ from those in the rest of Canada,
and that labour unions in that province play a larger role in the governance of the activities of
labour fund managers than do unions in other provinces. The data are lacking to evaluate this
anecdotal evidence, but it is natural to expect differences across funds, and the characteristics of
the people involved with the funds clearly play a significant role in their eventual outcomes. It is
also possible that the people involved might have done a better job had the statutory constraints
of the LSVCC program been designed differently. Nevertheless, there is ample room for
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Figure 4: Returns of LSVCCs versus Returns of a Random Sample of






























Source: Prepared by Finn Poschmann, C.D. Howe Institute, Toronto, based on data from www.morningstar.ca.
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TSE 300 Composite Index / TSX Total Return Index US Post-venture Capital Index
30-Day Treasury Bill Index
Source: Thomson Financial; www.globefunds.com; www.morningstar.ca.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 7
The average LSVCC ratio of management expenses to assets (MER) is more
than 4 percent, which is substantially higher than that for all other types of mutual
funds in either Canada or the United States (Cumming and MacIntosh,
forthcoming). Given that the economic rates of return for LSVCCs shown in
Figures 3 and 4 do not include management expenses, most LSVCCs clearly are
negative-value-added investment vehicles. Indeed, in the absence of tax subsidies,
it would not be rational for an investor to contribute capital to an LSVCC. One can
only conclude that, in Canada, venture capital has been inefficiently allocated due
to the tax breaks afforded to LSVCCs.
Perhaps relevant to the poor performance of LSVCCs, the managers of these
funds tend to have massive portfolios: on average, 6.5 investee companies per
investment manager, compared with 2.5 investee companies per manager for
private independent limited partnership venture capital funds (Cumming 2006a).
Normally, venture capital managers undertake the supervision of a few investee
companies only in order to spend time adding value to their investees by sitting
on boards of directors and providing strategic, finance, marketing, and human
resource advice.
10 Research has shown, however, that a learning curve is
associated with venture capital investing — that is, a major hurdle in creating
sustainable venture capital markets involves developing skilled venture capital
managers (see, for example, Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2004b; Gompers and Lerner
1999). Yet there is no empirical evidence that older LSVCCs perform better than
those more recently formed (Cumming and MacIntosh, forthcoming). One
possible explanation is that, with such massive portfolios, LSVCC fund managers
have little or no time to get involved in the management of their investee
companies. Of course, many LSVCC managers are likely highly capable
individuals, but policymakers might consider alternative mechanisms to improve
the training of younger fund managers other than the environment offered by the
typical LSVCC.
The inefficient allocation of venture capital through LSVCCs involves
significant costs. First, there are the direct costs of the tax subsidies, estimated to
be in excess of $3 billion over the 1992–2002 period (Cumming and MacIntosh
2004). Second, there are the indirect costs of LSVCCs’ competing directly with
other types of venture capital funds — in effect, crowding them out (see Cumming
and MacIntosh 2006). Tax subsidies enable LSVCCs to out-bid other venture
capital funds for investee companies, thereby discouraging institutional investors
and private fund managers from starting private venture capital funds, since
LSVCCs inefficiently drive up deal prices and lower returns in the market. Risk-
averse institutional investors commit capital prior to knowing the increase in
LSVCC fundraising in any given year. Risk-averse institutional investors are
thereby likely to overestimate the extent of LSVCC funding and so reduce their
commitments to private venture capital funds. In effect, LSVCCs might even
reduce the size of the venture capital market if the crowding out is pronounced.
10 Other evidence indicates that LSVCCs are much less likely to have successful exit outcomes than
private independent limited partnership venture capital funds, and much more likely to have
unsuccessful buyback exits and secondary sales than initial public offerings and acquisitions. See
Cumming and Johan (2006a); for earlier work, see MacIntosh (1997) and Cumming and
MacIntosh (2003a, 2003b).In sum, LSVCCs have fallen short of achieving their intended objectives for
bolstering the Canadian venture capital market. In response to this failure,
provincial governments have recently shown signs of the need to reform the
public subsidization of LSVCCs. For example, Nova Scotia has placed its funds
under a year-to-year watch since 2004 to determine if the tax credit should
continue, and in August 2005 Ontario announced plans to completely drop the tax
credits afforded to its LSVCCs.
11 As another example, the lack of supervision of
fund manager activities gave rise to a situation in which bad management
persisted for years in Manitoba’s Crocus Fund. Scandals were so pronounced that
the Crocus Fund had to halt trading on share redemption in December 2004, and
was thereafter shut down.
12 Concern over the structure and governance of
LSVCCs and evidence that they crowd out private venture capital investment
suggest that Ontario’s taking the lead in abandoning LSVCCs may be timely.
Alternatives to LSVCCs
If LSVCCs are not working, are there better policy options? Broadly classified,
public policies toward venture capital come in one of two primary forms: law —
which can be categorized further into taxation, securities law, and other types of
laws for facilitating entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance; and direct
government investment schemes; for an overview, see Table 2, where I briefly
review the properties, benefits, and drawbacks of these different policies.
Taxation
At least four important types of tax incentives enable entrepreneurial finance
around the world: capital gains taxes, research and development (R&D) tax
policies, the taxation of stock options, and double taxation treaties for offshore tax
havens (see Table 2, panel A).
Perhaps the best-known and most important tax mechanism affecting venture
capital markets is the capital gains tax. Indeed, theory and empirical evidence
suggest a direct causality between lower capital gains taxation and more venture
capital.
13 For example, the United States reduced its capital gains tax rate from 35
percent in 1977 to 20 percent in 1982, and during the same period venture capital
fundraising increased from US$68.2 million to US$2.1 billion (see Figure 5 for
details). As entrepreneurial companies typically do not have the positive cash
flows to pay interest on debt and dividends on equity, venture capitalists
invariably invest with a view toward exiting the market and taking the ensuing
capital gains.
8 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary




13 See Poterba (1989a, 1989b); Gompers and Lerner (1998); Jeng and Wells (2000); Keuschnigg (2003,
2004); Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c); and Armour and
Cumming (2006). I do not address tax-neutrality issues here, but they are worth considering by


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 13
Tax incentives for R&D expenditures represent another important public policy
toward venture capital markets and one that many countries have adopted (see
Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen 2002). Australia, for example, had a flat R&D tax
concession of 125 percent, prior to 2001, for all firms with eligible R&D expenses
in that country. In 2001, a policy change introduced a 125 percent rebate (or offset)
for firms with R&D expenses between AU$20,000 and AU$1 million and turnover
of less than AU$5 million. The most interesting feature of the policy change,
however, was the introduction of a premium 175 percent R&D tax concession as
an incentive to accelerate R&D expenses, available only for incremental R&D
above the firm’s most recent three-year history of average R&D expenditures.
14
This Australian R&D tax policy design has induced significantly more R&D in a
cost-effective manner, and suggests Canada’s tax policy toward R&D
15 might
benefit from implementing similar kinds of premium concessions.
A third important mechanism for facilitating entrepreneurship is the taxation
of stock options. In the United States, for example, the Internal Revenue Service
passively acquiesces in valuations of employee stock options that motivate people
to start companies. As Gilson and Schizer (2003, 876-78) note:
14 In Cumming (2006b), I estimate the “inducement rate” — or the amount of additional R&D
expenditure made for every dollar of benefit from tax concessions given to a firm — for the tax
offset to be significantly greater than 100 percent for the premium tax concession with incentive
hurdles to spend more on R&D than in previous years, and much higher than that in countries
without special hurdles, as estimated by Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002) among others.
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e[Venture capital] [p]ortfolio companies issue convertible preferred stock to achieve
more favorable tax treatment for the entrepreneur and other portfolio company
employees. The goal is to shield incentive compensation from current tax at
ordinary income rates, so managers can enjoy tax deferral (until incentive
compensation is sold, or longer) and a preferential tax rate... [by assigning an
artificially low value to the entrepreneurs’ common equity claim at the time of
investment].
Evidence suggests that the application of this type of tax incentive is much less
prevalent in Canada than in the United States.
16
The fourth tax mechanism affecting venture capital markets is tax incentives
for venture capital fund managers to establish offshore funds in tax havens, such
as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and Labuan, Malaysia. As Cumming and Johan
(2006b) explain, offshore funds come in two types: inbound — those established
by institutional investors from other countries and where the fund invests
specifically in one country; and outbound — those established by institutional
investors from one country and where the fund invests in other countries.
17
Overall, significant incentives exist for establishing venture capital funds in
offshore jurisdictions, as investors are able to take advantage of double taxation
agreements when they repatriate their profits from the various jurisdictions in
which the fund has invested. The Canadian government, however, benefits from
venture capital companies established abroad only to the extent that investment
dollars flow to entrepreneurial companies in Canada. Thus, governments need to
be careful to monitor offshore funds that invest within their jurisdiction to ensure
that the investment is not facilitating excessive tax avoidance or evasion.
Analogous to offshore tax haven funds, many European venture capital funds
invest in German entities through an intermediate holding company resident in
Luxembourg in order to take advantage of the Grand Duchy’s more favourable tax
rules. Industry commentators believe this is an important incentive for venture
capital investment in Germany, and proposals to curb this tax incentive have been
criticized despite the loss of tax revenues for that country.
18 The lesson from the
Luxembourg-Germany example is that a balance should be found between the
provision of favourable tax treatment to facilitate investment and the country’s
need to collect tax revenues.
Securities Laws
Securities laws constitute another form of public policy relating to venture capital
markets. They facilitate entrepreneurial finance in two main ways (see Table 2,
panel B). First, where securities laws make exemptions from prospectus
requirements more readily available for entrepreneurs seeking to raise capital,
14 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
16 Sandler (2001) discusses the Canadian tax treatment of employee stock options.
17 Cumming and Johan (2006b) find, in a sample of 50 funds from 17 countries, that 28 percent were
outbound offshore and 12 percent were inbound offshore.
18 See, for example, comments by S.J. Berwin at www.sjberwin.com, September 8, 2006.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 15
they lower the costs of raising funds.
19 Second, if securities laws make hold period
and prospectus requirements overly onerous for companies that seek an initial
public offering (IPO), the costs of IPOs increase, particularly for smaller
companies. Less onerous prospectus requirements, however, risk encouraging
fraudulent behaviour (as, for example, in the infamous 1997 Bre-X case).
Foreign-ownership restrictions implemented by protectionist governments can
also adversely affect entrepreneurial finance. Such restrictions are still in place in
Canada for a number of industries; lifting them would facilitate foreign
investment in this country, increase the supply of capital, and give Canadian
entrepreneurs better access to capital. Similarly, Canadian investors would benefit
from the lifting of foreign-ownership restrictions abroad; some of those benefits
might be repatriated back to Canada. Moreover, in countries with weak standards
for minority shareholders, the lifting of foreign-ownership restrictions would
make companies better off, since majority foreign owners would be held to the
higher standard of the foreign country when it comes to the rights of minority
shareholders.
Regulations on the Demand for Entrepreneurial Capital
Since part of the mandate of LSVCCs is to provide capital for entrepreneurs, it is
worth addressing other legislative tools for facilitating entrepreneurship and the
demand for entrepreneurial capital. Among such tools are laws on bankruptcy,
labour, and business incorporation (see Table 2, panel C). Bankruptcy laws, in fact,
explain many of the international differences in rates of entrepreneurship and
venture capital, and there is ample evidence that entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy
laws facilitate self-employment and entrepreneurship, thereby spurring the
demand for venture capital (see, for example, Armour and Cumming 2005,
2006).
20 Also spurring entrepreneurship are labour laws that make it easier to fire
employees and laws on incorporation that reduce the number of procedures for
starting a business (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan 2006).
Another potentially important legislative instrument is patent law.
Conventional wisdom suggests patent laws encourage entrepreneurial activity by
rewarding innovators, but an academic debate has raged regarding the suitability
of patents. Some researchers argue that, since private incentives to invest in R&D
exist, innovators should not rely only on government.
21 Others suggest that
patents create monopolies and reduce competitive pressures, but competitive
pressures to innovate may be as important as patents; perhaps less controversial is
19 MacIntosh (1994) argues that Canadian prospectus requirements are too onerous and prospectus
exemptions too narrow, thereby making entrepreneurial capital relatively more costly than in
other countries, notably the United States. Since the passage of the United States Public Company
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (better known as Sarbanes-Oxley), it is
less clear whether capital costs are cheaper in Canada or in the United States; further research is
warranted.
20 Entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy laws directly benefit entrepreneurs, of course, but they can
also indirectly benefit investors, to the extent that investors capture part of the returns to more
risk-taking entrepreneurs.
21 See, for example, Aghion and Howitt (2005) and, more controversially, Boldrin and Levine (2002).the idea that patents encourage disclosure and technology transfer (see Gallini
2002).
One well-known problem with patent law and policy in both the United States
and Canada concerns “patent trolls”: firms and individuals that acquire patents,
not to further entrepreneurial activity, but to sue others that invent similar
technologies (see Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). For Canadians, the most illustrative
example is that of Waterloo-based Research in Motion (RIM) and its hand-held
BlackBerry computer device, where patent trolls obtained patents relevant to the
device but did not make use of them, then successfully sued RIM for a majority of
the profits.
22 Patent trolls clearly dissuade entrepreneurial activity, but patent laws
as they currently stand offer ample support for such behaviour.
Regulations on the Supply of Entrepreneurial Capital
In addition to laws that favour entrepreneurial activities, regulations governing
investments of institutional investors also encourage investment in venture capital
and private equity. In the United States, the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 established standards for the appropriate investment in venture capital
for part of the portfolios of pension funds (see Gompers and Lerner 1998);
standards that have since evolved as benchmarks for Canada as well. Similarly, in
2006, the Netherlands introduced the Financieel Toetsingskader (FTK), which
changed pension fund portfolio management standards to enable a closer
matching of assets and liabilities, thereby facilitating investment in venture capital
(see Cumming and Johan, forthcoming). Similar regulations that harmonize the
rules European institutional investors face also enable different types of
institutions (such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds) as well as
institutional investors from different countries to act as limited partners in venture
capital funds (ibid.). As a related matter, there is evidence that dissimilar
regulations in Quebec exacerbate the fragmentation of Canada’s venture capital
market (Cumming and Johan 2006c).
Unlike institutional investors, however, venture capital fund managers face
few regulations, which has hindered institutional investment in venture capital.
Institutional investors’ commitments to venture capital are influenced by the fund
performance reports they receive from venture capital funds and by their ability,
in turn, to disclose such reports to their clients and beneficiaries (such as
pensioners, in the case of pension plans). Prior to a lawsuit involving the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), venture capital funds
in the United States enjoyed complete secrecy in terms of disclosure of their
performance to the public generally, and reports by venture capital funds to their
institutional investors were not regulated.
23
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22 See, for example, http://cliffreeves.typepad.com/dyermaker/2005/12/rim_blackberry_.html.
23 The CalPERS lawsuit forced United States venture capital funds to disclose returns to public
institutional investors. As a result, some funds have restricted participation by public limited
partners. For example, Sequoia Capital ejected the University of Michigan as an institutional
investor in its funds; see
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The effect of a comparative dearth of regulations on the flow of funds into the
venture capital market is not certain without empirical scrutiny. On the one hand,
the lack of such regulations might facilitate the flow of funds into the venture
capital market by giving the funds the flexibility they need to carry out their
investment activities without interference from regulatory oversight and reporting
requirements, a view often put forward in the popular press by venture capital
funds and commentators.
24 On the other hand, institutional investors often argue
that the comparative dearth of regulation of venture capital funds and lack of
reporting standards act as a disincentive to contribute to venture capital funds, a
view supported by Cumming and Johan (forthcoming);
25 as a result, some pension
funds have been forced to rethink their investment strategy with respect to
venture capital funds.
26
Thus, rules (or at least formal guidelines) that increase investment
transparency clearly would facilitate institutional investment in venture capital.
The lack of well-accepted standards for reporting returns on unexited venture
capital investments has, in fact, turned institutional investors away from venture
capital funds, since fund managers tend to overreport such returns (see Cumming
and Waltz 2004). Attempts to curb this problem include the introduction in 2006 of
new generally accepted accounting principles and clearly described industry
standards for valuation by the Canadian Venture Capital & Private Equity
Association and similar associations in other countries.
27
Direct Government Investment Programs
Aside from legal incentive structures, the second main form of government
support for entrepreneurial finance is via direct, government-created, or
government-subsidized venture capital funds (see Table 2, panel D).
28 Such funds
need to partner with, not compete with, other types of venture capital funds,
however; they also need to bridge the gap when the market fails — due to, for
example, structural impediments giving rise to a dearth of capital. Further,
24 See, for example, Cobley (2005), who argues that, in the United Kingdom, regulations hamper the
flow money flow into venture capital, while a dearth of such regulations in continental Europe
facilitates flows there. Other examples are Dickson (2005); Mackie (2005); and Tricks (2005), who
argue that new United Kingdom disclosure laws are making venture capital groups
uncomfortable. See also Hill (2005), who argues that overly strict regulations hamper the
expansion of investments in alternative asset classes.
25 In the United States, for example, the Institutional Limited Partners Association has been
working toward setting standards for reports from venture capital funds, while in March 2004 the
National Venture Capital Association rejected a proposal on valuation guidelines by the Private
Equity Industry Guidelines Group, which has created controversy among the various industry
associations; see http://www.privateequityonline.com/TopStory.asp?ID=4498&strType=1.
26 For example, CalPERS has been forced to reconsider its venture capital allocations in ways that
differ from what it might otherwise have done but for the public disclosure; see
http://www.ventureeconomics.com/vcj/protected/1070549534318.html.
27 See, for example,
http://www.privateequityvaluation.com/documents/IPEV_Press_Release_15.11.2006.pdf.
28 This section draws on material presented in Cumming and MacIntosh (2007); an earlier version
was presented in Cumming (2007), as a report to the Australian government. See also Lerner
(1999, 2002); Cressy (2002); and Cumming and MacIntosh (2006, 2007).government funds should be structured to minimize agency costs associated with
the financing of small and high-tech companies. As discussed earlier, the
covenants implemented under the LSVCC program are precisely the opposite of
what would be an efficient investment vehicle.
Countries have adopted different forms of direct government investment
programs for venture capital. The United States, for example, has the Small
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program, administered by the Small Business
Administration (SBA). The SBIR program is the largest government support
program for venture capital in the world, with SBIRs having invested more than
US$21 billion in nearly 120,000 financings of small businesses since the 1960s.
Investee companies include such successes as Intel Corporation, Apple Computer,
Federal Express, and America Online.
SBIRs, which are run by private investment managers, operate like private,
independent, limited partnership venture capital funds, except that they are
subject to statutory terms and conditions on the types of investments they make
and the manner in which investments are carried out.
29 SBIRs do not distinguish
between types of businesses, although investments in buyouts, real estate, and oil
exploration are prohibited. Investee companies are required to be small (as defined
by the SBA) — and generally smaller than companies that would be considered
for private independent limited partnership venture capital financing. The SBA
provides capital to SBIRs at a lower required rate of return than typical
institutional investors in private, independent, limited partnership venture capital
funds. Excess returns to SBIRs flow to the other non-governmental private
investors and fund managers, thereby increasing or leveraging their returns.
Empirical evidence shows that early-stage companies financed by SBIRs have
substantially higher growth rates than non-SBIR financed companies (Lerner
1999).
The SBIR program has been quite effective in spurring venture capital
investment and creating sustainable companies, but Canada’s existing institutional
environment might not enable an effective SBIR-like program to operate here.
In Australia, the federal government adopted an Innovation Investment Fund
(IIF) program in 1997. In each of the nine funds created so far, the ratio of
government capital to privately sourced capital is as much as two to one, a
substantial government share deemed necessary because of the scant early-stage
venture capital investment available in Australia when the program was
established. As with the United States SBIR program, a key feature of the
Australian IIF program is that it operates like a private independent limited
partnership venture capital fund. Investments generally take the form of equity
and must be in small, new-technology companies. At least 60 percent of each
fund’s committed capital must be invested within five years. Unless specifically
approved by the Australian government’s Industry Research and Development
Board, an investee company cannot receive more than AU$4 million, or 10 percent
of the fund’s committed capital, whichever is the smaller.
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29 For example, the minimum period of investment is one year, and an SBIR can indirectly or
directly control the investee company for a maximum period of seven years. For a summary of
these terms and conditions, see http://www.sba.gov/INV/overview.html.Evidence suggests that IIFs are fostering the development of the Australian
venture capital industry in a statistically and economically significant way
(Cumming 2007). Indeed, both the United States SBIR and Australian IIF programs
indicate the tremendous potential governments have to foster innovation and
economic development through the public subsidization of venture capital.
For its part, the United Kingdom has adopted a type of fund, similar to
Canada’s LSVCCs, known as the Venture Capital Trust (VCT). Like LSVCCs, the
VCTs are mutual funds listed on stock exchanges, and are not operated like
private independent limited partnership venture capital funds as are United States
SBIRs and Australian IIFs. As in Canada, VCT investors are individuals (retail
investors), who receive substantial tax incentives for contributing capital to the
funds. In exchange for the tax subsidy, VCT managers agree to adhere to a set of
statutory covenants that constrain their investment decisions and activities. Like
their Canadian counterparts, however, the VCTs have not been as successful in
achieving their objectives as the Australian and United States models, prompting
some commentators to argue that the United Kingdom would benefit significantly
benefit from adopting a United States-style SBIR Program (see, for example,
Connell 2006).
Other Kinds of Government Support
Governments offer a number of other kinds of support to venture capital markets
in addition to the examples discussed above, including loans, paying government
investors last in the event of insufficient funds, and bailouts for losses (see Table 2,
panel D; for an extended discussion, see Jääskeläinen, Maula, and Murray 2006).
But such provisions also create potentially distortionary agency problems




32 Empirical evidence suggests, however, that debt is not used when the
agency costs associated with it are expected to be pronounced (see Cumming
2005a, 2005b). Similarly, if managers of government-supported venture capital
funds expect such problems to be pronounced, then these schemes are not likely to
be as valuable as one might think. 
Governments have also delved into wholly government-owned venture capital
organizations, such as the Canada Community Investment Plan,
33 although
research suggests that such programs are more likely to finance companies that
might not otherwise receive capital, such as entrepreneurial companies in
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 19
30 Underinvestment refers to situations where equity investors do not want to spend more time on or
add value to a venture that is facing bankruptcy, since they (unlike debt holders) would obtain
no economic benefit from doing so.
31 Risk shifting refers to the tendency of equity holders to undertake excessively risky projects to
transfer expected wealth from debt holders to equity holders. If the venture does well, equity
holders earn more money and debt holders gain no extra benefit. If the venture does poorly, both
equity holders and debt holders lose their capital.
32 Asset stripping refers to the incentives equity holders have to steal assets out of companies that
face bankruptcy. A common example is when equity holders pay themselves a large dividend
shortly before announcing bankruptcy. See, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976); and Green
(1984).
33 See http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inccip-picc.nsf/en/h_cw01102e.html.regionally isolated communities (see Bates 2002; Lerner 2002). Other government
programs, such as Canada’s Export Development Corporation, focus on increasing
the exports of domestic firms, or on privatization, which increases the scope of
viable projects that venture capitalists consider to be investment opportunities (see
Megginson et al. 2004). The success of these various policy strategies depends on a
wide range of structural, political, and economic factors, and on the way the
policies are implemented.
Summary
Canada’s LSVCCs are inefficient, may have poor governance structures, charge
high fees, and earn economic returns that lag those of 30-day, risk-free treasury
bills. Further, government expenditures on LSVCCs have not resulted in value-
added venture capital investment, and appear to have crowded out private
venture investment in Canada. Ontario abandoned tax subsidies to LSVCCs in
2005, and research suggests that the federal and other provincial governments
should follow suit.
In place of LSVCCs, a variety of other ways exist to promote entrepreneurship
and efficient entrepreneurial investment. Canadian policymakers should
investigate these alternatives fully, including such appropriate legal changes as
entrepreneur-friendlier bankruptcy laws, lower capital gains taxes, and less-
onerous securities regulation, as well as direct government programs such as those
in place in the United States and Australia.
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